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While the United States remains involved in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, perhaps it would be useful to reflect upon one 
of its past involvements: The War of Lebanon. Also referred 
to as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), it was one of the 
most complex conflicts in the modern Middle Eastern history. 
In its culminating period (1982-1984) the United States 
became involved within the multinational peacekeeping 
framework. In the same period Lebanon also saw the 
involvement of Israel and Syria. In the persisting anarchy 
and chaos, the U.S. authorities failed to properly plan the 
mission, despite the U.S.’s technological, military, 
intelligence, and diplomatic superiority. The U.S. under 
Reagan Administration did not understand the complex 
Lebanese political and wartime reality; they underestimated 
the threats; and most importantly, failed to be neutral 
peacekeepers. To easily observe this complex period and 
tragic events that took place, I propose an allegoric 
comparison of the features of the Marine’s mission failure to 
that of a funnel. Any funnel normally has broad and narrow 
parts. When this set of features is attached to the Mission in 
Lebanon, it becomes rather clear that from the outset, the 
U.S. involvement suffered from general, broad, and very 
fundamental shortcomings. These discrepancies, such as 
the ones within their general approach, policy, unawareness 
of complexities, and a burden of unwisely chosen alliances, 
translated into “narrow parts” i.e. specific situations in the 
field, which made it impossible for the mission to be carried 


































discrepancies, disunited American leadership, and the 
abovementioned shortcomings, the U.S. Marines could not 
adapt to Lebanon’s ruthless environment. Hence they were 
exposed to brutal terrorist attacks, the deadliest of which 
took place in October 1983, when the headquarters of the 
Marine Battalion Landing Team were heavily bombed. 241 
Marines died in this attack, and shortly after, the U.S. was 
forced to withdraw its forces, which altogether made this 




On the dawn of October 23, 1983, a terrorist detonated 
explosives wrapped around gas cylinders of his truck, with 
which he forcefully ran into the headquarters of the United 
States Marine Battalion Landing Team. The buildings were 
destroyed with the force of approximately 12,000 pounds of 
TNT, whose explosion killed 241 and wounded 78 U.S. 
Armed Services personnel (Clyde 1984: 1). Thorough 
investigations started to take place immediately after this 
tragic event. Roughly two months later, on December 19, 
1983, the Investigations Subcommittee, which was the part 
of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives, concluded a report titled Adequacy of U.S. 
Marine Corps Security in Beirut (hereafter referred to as the 
HASC report). This report addressed the following crucial 
questions: “(1) What [were] the U.S. policy objectives in 
Lebanon; (2) How [did] the marine mission contribute to 
those objectives; and (3) Whether the risks to the marines 
were adequately assessed and whether adequate 
precautions were taken to counter them” (HASC 1983).  
Apparently, this attack was the culmination of failures 
that took place in the period of 1982-1984. After they had 
more or less successfully escorted the withdrawing 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) upon the Israelis’ 
reaching of the Beirut area, the United States Marines, who 
together with the French and Italian Forces used to form the 
Multinational Forces mission (MNF) also withdrew on 
September 10, 1982. This quick withdrawal created a 
security vacuum in the Beirut area, resulting in the 
assassination of the Christian Lebanese President Bashir 
Gemayel, and quick Phalangist response—the slaughter of 
  67
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



















the Palestinian civilians in their refugee camps at Sabra and 
Shatila (Quandt 1984: 240). President Reagan ordered the 
Marines to return and immediately form a new Multinational 
Force, which together with the U.S.’s diplomatic apparatus 
ultimately failed to serve the U.S. interests and successfully 
execute the U.S. policy towards Lebanon. 
When analyzing the causes of this overall failure, one 
becomes confronted with a multitude of developments in 
various areas: 1) policy shortcomings; 2) ineffective 
communication and chain of command; 3) failure to 
understand the complexity of the military, cultural, and 
political situation in Lebanon; 4) technical difficulties and 
physical in-the-field security shortcomings; 5) conflict of 
interests in local, regional and international political arenas; 
as well as 6) “uneasy” alliances rooted in historical 
backgrounds. Not all of these liabilities were of the same 
magnitude, but it was indeed a sum of all of these issues in 
the equation that ultimately produced the failure and 
withdrawal of the US Marines and Personnel shortly after the 
bombing.  
In order to understand the matter, one needs to 
scrutinize it systematically. One may realize that the result of 
the aggregate of those issues can be observed as, what I 
would dare to call, the Funnel Effect. Just like water in the 
upper part of a funnel, in the broader area broader concepts 
such as general approach, policy, administration, and 
alliances play a role. The issues around these broad and 
general concepts ultimately translate or “trickle down” into 
more specific problems in the narrower areas—namely to 
those in the Lebanese battlefield. What we are ultimately left 
with is a draining whirl and the “leaked-out water;” in other 
words the failure to achieve successes regarding policy, 
stability, and security. 
I hereby argue that the United States’ involvement in the 
Lebanese arena had been sentenced to failure from the very 
beginning: unrealistic policies, unawareness of the 
situational, sociopolitical and cultural complexities, disunited 
administrational and political approach, as well as obstacle-
benefit duality regarding the relations with Israel and the 
Lebanese government, in the long run all translated into 
specific shortcomings in the field. These shortcomings 
mainly pertain to the overall perception and execution of the 
mission, as well as security of the marines and officers 
involved. As a result of this funnel effect, hundreds of these 
people died, and the net impact of the mission turned out to 



































Policy and Approach Issues 
In the early 1980s, when the Lebanese Civil War had 
already taken its shape, the Reagan Administration outlined 
the elements of the United States policy towards Lebanon. 
The policy was brought with respect to Lebanon’s wartime 
political situation, which has a fairly complex background. In 
1975, the Christian Phalangist Party (known as the 
Phalange), invited Syria to intervene on its behalf against the 
Shiite and Druze militias. Despite the fact that the Phalange 
later regretted the move, Syria under Hafez al Assad 
managed to earn legitimacy from the Arab League in 1976. 
Declaring itself the Arab Deterrent Force, Syria specified that 
it will not leave Lebanon unless Arab League requested it to 
do so (Weinberger 1983: 342; Kasperski and Crockett 
2004). Besides Syria, Israel under the government of 
Menachem Begin also invaded Lebanon in 1982 with the 
goal of destroying the PLO and thus making possible the 
eventual annexation of the West Bank. Lebanon, which was 
already divided into sectarian enclaves, each having its own 
ethnic and religious militias, experienced even more 
hardships upon the entrance of the two foreign armies, each 
supporting “their” selected militia groups (Cleveland 2004: 
386-387).  
To remove this complication, and enable the creation of 
order and eventual ceasefire, the Reagan administration 
devised the following set of policy goals: “Withdrawal of all 
foreign forces, support for an independent Lebanese 
government with control over all of its territory, peaceful 
relations between Lebanon and Israel, and encouragement 
for the process of political reconciliation within Lebanon” 
(Quandt 1984: 250). 
 Despite the fact that this policy and its objectives 
sounded plausible, they were, however, marked by the use 
of completely unrealistic tools for their implementation. One 
of the early tools applied for this policy was the so-called 
Reagan Plan, issued on September 1, 1982. This initiative 
made an explicit linkage between the Lebanese and West 
Bank issues, since Reagan believed that settling the 
problems of the West Bank would simultaneously provide 
tools for solving issues in Lebanon, even though he did not 
bother to properly include and mention Syria in this process. 
This initiative was ultimately rejected by all involved parties, 
especially Israel, who sabotaged it since the settling of the 
West Bank issues did not necessarily coincide with Begin’s 
plans of the area’s annexation to Israel’s territory. The 
Policy-overstretch was quite obvious: “The Reagan Plan 
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expanded the administration’s agenda, making it difficult to 
handle either Lebanon or the Palestinians” (Spiegel 1985: 
422).  
  Even though the application of this tool failed, its 
result, as William B. Quandt (1984) put it: “made the 
Administration even more eager for a success in Lebanon, 
especially since the situation there was becoming more 
costly for American interests” (p. 244). The Administration’s 
eagerness became significantly amplified when, after the 
assassination of the Lebanese President Gemayel, Israelis 
entered the Beirut area and turned a blind eye to the 
Phalange’s slaughter of the Palestinian refugees and 
sacking of their camps as an act of revenge for the 
previously mentioned assassination of Phalangist President 
Gemayel. However, prior to this tragic development the 
Multinational Force had departed. They were desperately 
needed to come back to prevent future potential onslaughts. 
The MNF was reestablished in Lebanon, but the condition 
were now became entirely different—and for the future of the 
U.S.’ mission—not very favorable.  
 In these situations, it would be logical to expect the 
involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping forces who 
would aim to create stability and prevent further bloodshed. 
However, this motion was unacceptable to Israel. As the 
HASC Report (1983) testifies: “The Israeli’s would not trust 
any international force unless the United States 
participated.” Furthermore, there was already a planned 
UNIFIL force in place, which was not able to operate due to 
the physical and operational intensity of the Israeli invasion 
of 1982. Nevertheless, the Resolution 425 defined UNIFIL’s 
objectives as “confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, 
restoring international peace and security and assisting the 
government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective 
authority in the area” (Weinberger 1983: 342). Even though 
these objectives looked satisfactory and were apparently in 
accordance with the U.S. policy, the decisive and immediate 
enforcement of this resolution did not coincide with Israeli 
interests. Instead, the Multinational Force (MNF), led by the 
United States had to perform the peacekeeping work, with 
the emphasis on neutrality.  
The notion of neutrality was perhaps one of the greatest 
paradoxes of the U.S. involvement in Lebanon. As the 
HASC Report concludes, the key objectives of this new 
mission were: “the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Lebanon, re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty after 
the withdrawal, and assurance that Lebanon would not be 


































Apparently, these same objectives made the core of the 
previously discussed United States’ policy towards Lebanon. 
Furthermore, the mission’s objective put less emphasis on 
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, while it 
introduced a new concept, namely that Israel shall be 
protected from attacks. The peacekeeping goal of the 
mission which was supposed to be multinational and neutral 
had been compromised. Also, the Report clearly states that 
another key objective of the MNF mission “was to support, 
help train and arm the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)” 
(HASC Report 1983). It is now necessary to recall that the 
LAF was predominantly Christian, and commanded by the 
Phalange Party. This means that the United States would 
indirectly be aiding one of the sectarian militias, 
camouflaged as the national army. The scandal becomes 
greater if one learns that Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the 
LAF had long maintained close political connections with 
Israel, particularly with the Israeli Defense Minister of the 
time, Ariel Sharon, hoping that the Israeli invasion would 
make his rise to power easier (Quandt 1984: 240; 
(Cleveland 2004: 387). The LAF was, as such, unacceptable 
to virtually all other powerful factions, especially the Druze 
and the Shiite militias. Whether the Reagan Administration 
was aware of these issues can be left to debate, but the 
truth remains: the U.S. Marines were not the neutral 
peacekeepers, and were thus exposed to attacks and 
security threats coming from the antagonist factions. Finally, 
one instance which surely proves the United States taking 
clear side, is when it supported the LAF with naval gunfire 
during the fighting at Souq el Gharb in September 1983. 
This was a clear sign to Muslim population that the United 
States is no peacekeeper, but a Christian supporter. It is 
interesting that President Reagan, when introducing the 
mission in his letter to the Speaker of the House on 
September 29, 1982, clearly stated: “In carrying out this 
mission, the American force will not engage in combat” 
(HASC Report 1983). 
Israeli Alliance Issue 
Speaking of the withdrawal of the foreign armies, as 
specified in the mentioned U.S. policy, another broad issue 
enters the game: the historical alliance with Israel. It can be 
argued that this alliance had served the U.S. in geopolitical 
sense, but in this case, the alliance handicapped the United 
States by making it unable to pressure Israel to withdraw 
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and to allow the UN to take over the peacekeeping affairs. 
This, above all, was a true dilemma for the U.S. at its home 
front, since the support of Israel was one of the keys to the 
Administration’s preservation of power.1 This may also be 
one of the clues why, in their last MNF policy, the Americans 
grew more “protective” of Israel. Hadar (1992: 32-33) 
provides an account that links the issue of the U.S.-Israeli 
alliance to the American domestic politics:  
One element of the Middle Eastern foreign policy triangle 
is the Israeli lobby that includes a network of American 
Jewish organization headed by the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which delivers 
favorable votes and financial support for members of 
Congress in exchange for their securing votes for 
financial aid and other benefits for Israel. The Israeli 
lobby also mobilizes congressional support for policies 
advanced by the bureaucracy in exchange for rewards 
(e.g., transfer of sophisticated arms) to Israel from the 
executive branch… The American support for Israel, 
framed in moral and historical terms, was largely the 
result of domestic political considerations, in particular 
the need to court the Jewish vote. 
President Reagan himself earned a great deal of the 
initial domestic popularity exactly because of his stance on 
the issues concerning the Middle East: as a Republican, 
besides winning a large Jewish vote (39 percent), he initially 
won great support from pro-Israel evangelical groups such 
as the Moral Majority (Spiegel 1985: 397). Apparently, the 
United States has been linked to Israel from the outset, and 
it was not possible for them to act entirely on their own while 
being involved in the Lebanon crisis. Along with the costs 
that the alliance inflicted in this particular situation, the U.S. 
also exhibited a poor understanding of the complexities 
present in the Lebanese arena. The U.S. failed to fully 
understand other factions’ issues and features, and above 
all, their influence in the war. 
 
                     
1 For more insights on the ways Israel impacts the U.S. foreign policy see 
Mearsheimer John J. and Walt. Stephen. The Israel Lobby and U.S. 


































Reagan’s Unaware and Divided Administration  
The United States’ failure to understand the actual 
complexity of the situation had catastrophic consequences. 
Ever since the beginning, when he announced his Peace 
Plan, Reagan kept leaving out Syria and other opposing 
factions in the war, having thought of them as weak and not 
entirely relevant. However, Syria suddenly became 
resupplied by the Soviets, which helped them obtain the 
dictating power in Lebanon in the critical year of 1983. 
Logically, Shiite and Druze militias received a strong backing 
from Syria, whose potential was not completely understood 
by the opposing powers, especially the United States 
(Quandt 1984: 241-242). Only after the U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut suffered a terrorist bombing attack which killed 57 
people did the United States try to reach out for Syria and 
bring them to the table.  
When the Secretary of State Shultz for the first time 
visited Damascus in May 1983, he learned that Syrian 
President Assad rejected the implication that his forces 
would receive the “same legal status as those of Israel,” and 
that he refused to leave Lebanon under their conditions 
(Quandt 1984: 244). This unawareness of the situation put 
the United States in a more difficult situation, as the attacks 
proceeded in 1983. It seemed as if they were caught off-
guard as a result of the flaws within their earlier approach, 
and now had less political means to confront the challenges. 
 Generally speaking, throughout this period the 
Administration never succeeded in acquiring realistic means 
to achieve its policies, it did not have a good sense for 
priorities, and it lacked a fully dedicated leadership, as well 
as a deep knowledge of local Lebanese realities (Spliegel 
1985: 398-400). Reagan, on the other hand, had a 
somewhat naïve good-vs.-evil image of the world, which 
made his way of thinking and his general approach highly 
inapplicable to the complex Lebanese situation. His 
approach to this Middle Eastern crisis was marked by a 
combination of emotion, ideology, and a lack of knowledge. 
Before the beginning of the involvement, he reportedly said: 
“I can’t see why they’re fighting. After all, they’re all 
Lebanese” (Spiegel 1985: 400).   
 Another feature, which also may have had a 
negative influence on the overall mission was the fact that 
the Administration was internally divided around the 
Lebanese and other Middle Eastern affairs. For instance, 
both of Reagan’s Secretaries of State George Shultz and 
Alexander Haig philosophically differed from, and were often 
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at odds with the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. 
Yet, all three happened to dominate the early decision-
making. The fact that they often stalemated and opposed 
each other when military questions were concerned created 
a decision-making chaos, thus severely affecting how and 
what decisions were brought, and how they were 
implemented in the face of the Lebanese War and the U.S. 
involvement. The effect of these divisions finally transpired in 
1984, when Reagan’s political advisers, who were affected 
by the domestic political considerations, took “advantage of 
his divided foreign policy team, [and] urged him repeatedly in 
late 1983 and early 1984 to withdraw” (Spiegel 1985: 398). It 
is true that the deadly attack on the Marine Battalion Landing 
Team headquarters in October 1983 greatly contributed to 
the eventual U.S. withdrawal, making the mission very 
unpopular in the American public’s eyes. However, the quick 
withdrawal also proves the extent of the inter-
Administrational divisions: the attack, no matter how horrific, 
did not manage to unite the American political elite of the 
time to even more decisively stand up to terrorism and 
factional provocations.  
 These broad decision making problems within the 
highest ranks had devastating effect on the workings in the 
field. The whirl in the funnel was starting to run faster as 
these shortcomings directly translated onto MNF’s everyday 
functioning on the Lebanese warring soil. 
The Funnel Turns Narrow: Security and the Mission 
Execution Shortcomings 
The previously discussed discrepancies within the broader 
issues ultimately had a great impact on the specific mission 
aspects in the field. Even though the United States-led 
Multinational Marine Force was not entirely neutral, they 
were nominally installed as the “neutral” peacekeepers who 
were supposed to stabilize the deeply divided war-driven 
country of Lebanon. As such, they were initially supposed to 
carry out their mission by exhibiting high visibility among the 
Lebanese population, thus giving them some “visual” sense 
of security and presence. The Marines had to continuously 
show flags, participate in civil service engagements, public 
meetings, etc. Having been responsible for this high 
visibility, it was not appropriate for the Marines to deploy 
excessive security measures in the physical sense, since 


































actually had to serve (HASC Report 1983). In simple words: 
visibility took precedence over their own physical security.  
Apparently, the security measures were rather poor and 
insufficient to fully protect the Marines from terrorist attacks. 
The fact that visibility tipped the balance at the expense of 
security (following the initial idea of the mission set by the 
shaky Administration), had hazardous consequences, as it 
was attested by the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and then 
an the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) headquarters—the 
culmination of the unsuccessful campaign.  
The BLT and the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) 
headquarters were both located at the Beirut International 
Airport, which was relatively close to the Shiite 
neighborhoods. Furthermore, the Investigations 
Subcommittee proved that the Battalion was protected only 
by the fence made off the low quality concertina wire, which 
most if the time had its gates open. The actual access to the 
buildings was supposed to be blocked by three large sewer 
pipes, which were later discovered to have been improperly 
placed, hence allowing the truck to drive in (HASC Report 
1983).  
Speaking of the conduct of the mission, one needs to 
closely observe the so-called Rules of Engagement (ROE), 
which had to be strictly adhered to. After the first attack on 
the Embassy, the ROE were changed, but only for the 
Marine team responsible for the Embassy. The ROE for the 
Marines at the BLT headquarters remained the same, which 
clearly indicates that the lessons from previous attack were 
insufficiently learned to protect the remaining people and 
assets. These unchanged rules  asked for some things 
which are hard to believe by some logical warfare standards. 
For instance, one of the rules specified that the guards at the 
Marine compound had to have their weapons unloaded 
(Clyde 1984: 5). Had the Marines’ weapons been properly 
loaded, perhaps the terrorist truck driver would have been 
prevented from blasting the buildings. 
As mentioned above, no specific measures were taken 
by the Marines after the Embassy was attacked. One reason 
for this may have been a very complex chain of command 
through which information and orders had to pass before 
becoming implemented. Also, whenever a decision was to 
be made by the field generals or captains, they had to take 
serious political considerations, given the fact that besides 
them, the present influential forces were those of Israel and 
the LAF (Clyde 1984: Appendix). 
Clearly, all decisions and orders came from “above” and 
were indirectly coined in high-level politics, which, when 
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trickled down to the actual on-the-field operations created 
some absurd phenomena, leaving the Marines vulnerable to 
attacks. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. was caught off-
guard, and even though it stayed for another four months 
(until February 1984), the bloody October 23, 1983 proved 
that, as the investigation addressed it, the Marine security 
was highly inadequate. Even though they were caught off-
guard, the United States still had numerous instruments that 
they could have applied to prevent such tragic incidents, 
namely those of diplomacy, intelligence and information, as 
well as military and technological superiority (Kasperski and 
Crockett 2004). Since the mission was marked by failure to 
properly and carefully organize, plan, and adapt to the new 
environment, these strengths could simply not have been 
used effectively. 
As the U.S. presidential election of 1984 approached, 
the bitter and critical public reaction to these developments 
grew in importance and political relevance. Reagan, for the 
first time since the MNF’s deployment stated that the U.S. 
forces “could be withdrawn if there [were] a collapse of order 
in Lebanon” (Quandt 1984: 249). One needs to recall that 
the objective of the U.S. forces was to help restore this 
order. Ultimately, it is clear that the U.S. succumbed to the 
combination of pain inflicted by the attacks and the public 
opposition. The mission failed.            
Conclusion   
The shortcomings within the general approach, the U.S. 
Policy towards Lebanon, the obstacles created by the United 
States- Israel alliance, as well as the problems within the 
Reagan Administration regarding both divisions and 
unawareness, all together create a core of broad and 
fundamental problems. If a highly delicate situation, such as 
the one that history has witnessed in the War of Lebanon, is 
approached with such fundamental flaws, contradictions and 
inconsistencies, the success is hardly possible. The United 
States was not sensitive to local Lebanese realities, and did 
not have a unified and carefully elaborated approach. 
Furthermore, it did not employ all the diplomatic instruments 
to contain its ally—Israel. Finally, its Policy was highly 
unrealistic and paradoxal in its implementation, since the 
MNF was everything but neutral. Unfortunately, these big 
inconsistencies spilled over into specific situations that the 
Marines had to face in Lebanon, which ultimately helped 


































United States mission initially ran broadly, while 
accompanied by the equally broad problems. It finished with 
a withdrawal, and had no positive effect on the Lebanese 
warring society.    
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